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ABSTRACT: For over 125 years, argumentation scholars have taught and studied academic debate. According to 
debate theory, reasonable argumentation satisfies six obligations: (1) self-administration; (2) making prima 
facie/presumptively adequate moves; (3) clash; (4) meeting the burden of proof; (5) rejoinder/rebuttal; and (6) 
extension. These obligations define a kind of procedural rationality for argumentation distinct from the kinds of 
rationality that are the focus of logical and rhetorical theories. Those obligations are grounded in the pragmatics of 
conversation and are made visible in debate practice. 
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1. THE DEBATE TRADITION 
 
The emergence of departments of speech (communication) in American universities at the turn of 
the twentieth century was fueled by insistence on an intellectual distinction between the literary 
and rhetorical criticism of oratory (Wichelns, 1925) and by an "orality alliance" of academic 
interests focused on the spoken word (Delia, 1987, p. 78). But also crucial was promotion of debate 
as a distinctive argumentative activity. Well through the 1970s debate held such a central place in 
the discipline that it was virtually impossible to find faculty members who had not debated, 
coached, or judged the activity (Goodwin, 2001). Yet, despite its original importance to the 
educational mission of field, debate as a source of argumentation theory has gone largely 
unnoticed--not just by scholars in other disciplines (e.g., informal logic in philosophy; argument 
studies in composition programs) or on other continents, but even within the field of 
communication itself, where the rhetorical tradition in argumentation studies has all but eclipsed 
the debate tradition.1  
 Numerous studies have compiled a history of debate (Braden & Brandenberg, 1955, pp. 
379-380; Cowperthwaite & Baird, 1954; Faules, Rieke & Rhodes, 1976, chapter 1;  Norton, 1982; 
Potter, 1954). By the 1880s, American colleges began introducing debate into the curriculum after 
several decades of debating sponsored by student-run literary societies. The Inter-State Oratorical 
League, composed of student groups from Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana, conducted 
its first contest in 1874. The very first intercollegiate debate was held on May 5, 1881 between the 
Phi Alpha Society of Illinois College and the Adelphi Society of Knox College, one day before a 
 
1 For example, in two comprehensive volumes on argumentation theory consisting of well over one-thousand pages, 
debate receives three and seven pages: Eemeren, et al, 1996: 193-196; Eemeren, et al 2014: 427-434. These two 
sections on the debate tradition seem to have been written in consultation with noted American rhetorical scholar 
and former Northwestern University Director of Debate, David Zarefsky. 
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debate between the Philomathian Society of New York University and the Peitho Society of 
Rutgers. After the Harvard Union faced off against the Yale Union on January 14 and March 25, 
1892, contest debating spread across academia. With heightened publicity, inevitable student and 
alumni competitiveness, financial strains on clubs, growing time demands on the debaters, and the 
academic prestige of colleges on the line, faculty were drawn into coaching, then offering academic 
credit, writing textbooks, and finally organizing full-scale debate programs housed within 
departments. While debate leagues began forming at the turn of the century, the first invitational 
debate tournament was hosted in 1923 at Southwestern College, Winfield, Kansas. Adoption of a 
single, annual national debate proposition of public policy further encouraged intersectional 
competition.  
 The very early debates seem to have continued the student literary society pattern, 
modelled on the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. The debates were presented before 
student audiences much like sporting events. There was a predetermined question, usually stated 
as a resolution to be affirmed and denied by two opposing sides, with sides being assigned in 
advance. The opposing teams would often exchange briefs a week or more in advance of the 
debate. If there were only single speakers, the Affirmative speaker presented a constructive speech, 
then a Negative speaker gave a constructive speech, followed by a closing Affirmative rebuttal. 
Both sides had equal speaking time in total but flexibility in allocating time to individual speeches. 
When there were two or three speakers for each side, Affirmative and Negative speakers alternated 
their constructive speeches, and then reversed order for the rebuttal speeches so that the 
Affirmative side was always given the closing remarks. Often, the constructive speeches were 
memorized completely, and sometimes even the rebuttals were wholly "canned."  
 While early on there was a great deal of experimentation in the design of the format, a 
standardization emerged in the 1920s that continues to this day. Audiences were abandoned for a 
single, "expert" judge in order to facilitate multi-round tournaments (Baird, 1950, p. 367; Rieke & 
Brock, 1975, p. 132). Each team consisted of two speakers, teams switching Affirmative and 
Negative sides for alternating debates against different opponents. Constructive speeches lasted 
ten minutes each. Rebuttal speeches were allotted five minutes each. Sometimes a brief cross-
examination of the speaker followed each constructive speech as the examiners' partner prepared 
their remarks (cutting speech times to eight and four minutes).  
 Expectations for speaker duties and practice within this standardized format emerged 
slowly over several decades. Those expectations can be discerned from records of debates (e.g., 
Pearson, 1909; Nichols, 1910-1928. See Phelps, 1948) and from the asides, complaints, and advice 
of successive textbooks. Suffice it to say here that tournament debate as practiced today would be 
unrecognizable to anyone participating in the early years. An outsider today would find 
unwatchable a round at a National Debate Association or Cross-Examination Debate Association 
tournament (watch Tolchinsky, 2011; or simply find one of the many tournament and practice 
rounds recorded on YouTube). 
 
2. THE DEBATE MODEL AND PRACTICE AS THEORETICAL OBJECT 
 
The design of contest debate has largely been considered from a practical and pedagogical stance. 
Some argumentation scholars have seen educational problems of how to better prepare debaters 
for more "realistic" venues (read: public oratory). Most coaches and textbook authors have seen 
problems calling for strategic advice to help debaters "win" their rounds.  
 3 
 Debate, however, presents a unique perspective and model of the nature of argumentative 
rationality. It is a dialectical perspective, and has much in common with the view re-introduced to 
argumentation studies by van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1983) Pragma-Dialectical model of 
critical discussion (see also Hamblin, 1970; Rescher, 1977). The model of debate, however, is 
distinctively American. It is adversarial, not cooperative in the sense of a discussion. While its 
implementations conclude with a timely decision, that is not its end. Winning and not 
reconciliation may be the motive of the parties, but neither is the design function of the activity. 
Truth-testing is the function. Truth-testing is an open-ended process that tends toward a kind of 
alignment without necessarily resulting in mutual agreement.  
 Presented almost always in practical terms for student debaters, it is possible to reconstruct 
the model as an abstract and theoretical distillation of essential properties of argumentative 
rationality. The debate model itself amounts to a normative description of argumentation at a 
pragmatic and procedural level of operation. That level can be distinguished from models of formal 
and substantive inference or of persuasive enactment and achievement. Drawing upon legal 
studies, the basic concepts and principles (burden of proof, presumption, prima facie case, burden 
of rebuttal) were first clearly formulated in O'Neill's revision of Laycock and Scales' (1904) 
practical debate textbook (O'Neill, Laycock & Scales, 1917, chapter 3). Many of O'Neill's 
intuitions had been noted in passing by previous scholars (e.g., Alden, 1900, p. 61; MacEwan, 
1899, p. 34; Thomas, 1910, pp. 29-33), and Whately's (1828/1963) treatment of burden of proof 
and presumption was standardly noted by rhetorical critics (e.g., Thonssen & Baird, 1948, pp. 139-
143). The impact of his ideas is attested to by the lifespan of the textbook through successive 
versions authored by O'Neill and his students (O'Neill & McBurney, 1932; McBurney, O'Neill & 
Mills, 1951; McBurney & Mills, 1964). The model was progressively articulated, debated, and 
elaborated in other textbooks as coaches and judges progressively designed and enforced an 
activity that better approximated their intuitive standards of reasonable engagement through 
argumentation. 
  Today, textbooks usually treat the general model of debate as a conventional but 
convenient framework for training skills in reasoning and analysis, as a game-like artifact without 
direct bearing on argumentation theory per se. I want to suggest a theoretical bearing: The model 
of debate should be taken as a description of procedural principles of argumentative rationality in 
general. And, rather than seeing the format and the actual practice of debate as a rather artificial 
simulation of more real-world forums, I want to suggest taking an analytic rather than pedagogical 
orientation. See the implementation of the model in practice as a kind of controlled laboratory for 
making observable our normative intuitions about the dynamics of the argumentation procedure 
and the requirements of good practice. Rather than just seeing failures of reasonableness as a 
practical "problem," see the occurrence and recognition of such problem as analytic puzzles. 
 
3. BACKGROUND FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEBATE MODEL 
 
 Academic debate can be seen as a specially engineered conversational practice put into 
practice by implicit training in the implementation of more or less explicit duties and obligations. 
The design features of that practice are intended to build in as an intrinsic function of 
argumentation something like the following basic value: 
 
PRIME DIRECTIVE: Determine the truth-value of any claim at issue by determining the 
force of the better argument, pro and con, and the force of the better argument alone. 
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The Prime Directive is a widely held in the argumentation community as a formulation of the 
normative force of argument, though some might resist or wonder about the reference to truth. The 
notion of truth here can be understood in fairly commonsense terms. By ‘truth,’ the Prime Directive 
is not committed to anything deeply metaphysical. It can be taken to mean much the same as 
minimalist and deflationary accounts of truth (Horwich, 1998). These accounts are consistent with 
but not committed to realism, antirealism, objectivism, constructionism, contextualism, idealism, 
empiricism, correspondence theories, coherence theories, or pragmatist theories. For sure there are 
preferred inclinations in the debate model, but nothing required. 
 Nor is this principle meant to restrict the range of propositions to which the terms ‘true’ or 
‘false’ apply. It makes just as much sense to say that “It is false that the Pieta is beautiful” as it 
does to say, “It is true that the Earth has existed for only 6000 years.” Restricting considerations 
of truth to propositions of fact (as opposed to propositions of value or policy) creates the obvious 
problem of how to explain the validity of inferences in arguments like the following: Killing is 
wrong. Abortion is killing. Therefore, abortion is wrong. Or again: We should do what is right. It 
is right to praise the Lord. Therefore, we should praise the Lord. Without a notion of truth, I see 
no way to explain the logic of implication or reason’s injunction against contradiction--central 
issues in any debate.  
 Nor do I see how to avoid the kind of circularity that comes from substituting acceptability 
for truth as a satisfaction condition on assertion. Acceptance is a speech act too, and it comes into 
play as soon as a proposition is asserted (i.e., put forward for acceptance). What, then, is the 
satisfaction condition on acceptance? Assertability? This just buries the problem of truth in the 
conditions for assertability/acceptability. We assert propositions as true and accept assertions as 
true. Nor am I satisfied with the relativism that results from what amounts to turning assertive-
type speech acts into group declarative-type speech acts. Everyone affirming that there is no global 
warming will not make it so.  
 Finally, just because it is tough (maybe even impossible) to tell whether or not any 
particular proposition is true shouldn’t be a reason for argumentation scholars to deny that the truth 
of propositions is central to argument analysis, evaluation, and practice. Deciding the status of 
propositions and the quality of arguments for and against propositions are just what debate aims 
to do. (See Jacobs, 2016, p. 160.) 
 In any case, very early on, academic debate became identified with a kind of decision-
making that emphasized truth-testing through justification in a way that relegated audience 
acceptability to a normatively derived consequence. The goal of "winning" was a recognized 
individual motivation that was allowed (even encouraged), but because it was controlled by the 
standards of a judge, it could be placed in the service of finding truth and exposing falsehood. 
Discussions of the proper roles of conviction and persuasion in debate reflected the tension 
between the dialectical and rhetorical impulses that animated early contest debating (cf., Baker, 
1895, p. 1; Gardiner, 1912, p. 2; Ketcham, 1928, p. 94; O'Neill, et al, 1917, pp. 3-7. Perry, 1906, 
p. 6; See O'Keefe, 2012). While most authors called for a balance of functions, audience 
acceptability (persuasion) soon became a secondary concern, then at best an incidental 
consequence.  
 The decades following the introduction of expert judges saw debate eventually drop any 
pretense of an interest in promoting norms of public oratory for a general audience, and judges 
dropped a "public speaking" model of decision with any emphasis on delivery (Kleinau, 1982, p. 
227). Debates were to be decided on technical considerations of argument quality and issue 
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engagement. By the time of the crisis of the 1970s, debate coaches widely viewed oral 
communication as a matter of convenience, incidental to the internal dynamics of debate itself. 
Judges were seen less as proxies for a public audience and more as "objective" if fallible calculators 
of the status of the issues during and at the end of the debate. The alienation of debate programs 
from rhetorical scholarship was widely bemoaned, though few recognized its fundamental 
intellectual basis. Most critics of academic debate continued to see it as an unrealistic (failed) 
simulation of practical forums rather than as a real (controlled) activity that served as a laboratory 
for discovering the essential properties of the dialectical pursuit of justified belief (see the 
discussions in McBath, 1975). 2  
 Satisfaction of the Prime Directive of argumentation and debate can be elaborated in three 
different directions, and can be stated as different but interrelated evaluation principles. The thing 
to see is that each principle provides a distinctive sense of argumentative rationality or 
reasonableness.  
 
INFERENTIAL ADEQUACY PRINCIPLE: Arguments should be evaluated in terms 
of their probative force, i.e., their value in establishing the truth-value of the claims at issue. 
The claims at issue should be evaluated in terms of the probative force of the arguments 
that justify or refute those claims. 
 
SITUATIONAL ADEQUACY PRINCIPLE: Claims and arguments should be evaluated 
in terms of how well they are adjusted to their relevant audiences and to the situations in 
which those audiences are engaged. Good claims and arguments should be presented in 
ways that maximally satisfy the competing demands of the situation.  
 
PROCEDURAL ADEQUACY PRINCIPLE: Claims and arguments should be evaluated 
in terms of the degree to which the procedures for testing those claims and arguments 
maximize full, open, and careful discovery and consideration of the quality of those claims 
and arguments. 
 
Argumentation theory in the tradition of logic and informal logic has been predominantly 
concerned with elaborating models and standards of good argument in the sense of inferential 
adequacy. Rhetorical theory has long insisted that good arguments navigate the tension between 
persuasive effectiveness and reasoned conviction so as to satisfy the demands of the situation, the 
audience being a crucial element of that situation (see Bitzer's, 1968, classic statement). It has been 
the unique contribution of dialectical models like debate to spell out in principle the kinds of 
 
2 Hagood (1975, pp. 101-102) quotes without any sense of approval the following statement by the director of the 
team winning the 1974 National Debate Tournament, Mark Arnold: 
I gather from past critiques of this final round that it is customary to deliver a Philippic upon the rapid-fire 
delivery of the debaters and upon the general concept of the spread. It is a custom I choose to ignore 
because, in my view, such condemnations mistake the fundamental nature of modern academic debate. 
They assume that debate is a speech activity, at least one important aim of which is the persuasion of the 
audience. In fact, debate is an intellectual game which employs speech communication merely as a 
convenience. It is far easier and quicker to conduct a twelve round tournament employing verbal 
communication [sic] than to utilize written interchanges. But the speech is peripheral rather than essential, 
and the location of debate programs under the aegis of speech or communication departments is largely an 
historical accident. The essence of debate is the intellectual clash between two teams. 
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procedures by which the quality of arguments can be decided (Inferential Adequacy) and by which 
audiences can be enabled to properly make decisions (Situational Adequacy).  
 This is not to say that debate textbooks from the earliest publications were overlooking the 
insights of logic and rhetoric. In fact, the vast bulk of attention of any textbook was and continues 
to be devoted to case and brief construction, tests of evidence, patterns of reasoning, fallacies, 
strategies of refutation and rebuttal, qualities of delivery and oratorical style, and audience 
adaptation--all the standard topics also found in textbooks on critical thinking, composition, or 
public speaking. Baker's (1895), The Principles of Argumentation and many subsequent early 
textbooks for debaters (Covington, 1918; Denney, Duncan & McKinney, 1910; Foster, 1904; 
Gardiner, 1912; Ketcham, 1914) had virtually no systematic discussion of the principles and 
rationale for debate procedure, usually not even a mention. Their focus was on the substance of 
briefs and individual speeches. Nevertheless, O'Neill's principle obligations and requirements of 
debate conduct were widely cited by the 1950s and, by the 1970s, formulation of the basic 
principles and requirements for debating were fairly standard (cf. Dick, 1972: chapter 2; Freeley, 
1961, pp. 16-19; Smith & Hunsaker, 1972, pp. 139-142; 149-151; Wood, 1968, pp. 15-17). 
 Still, the model of debate being formulated in this paper reflects an analytic move 
characteristic of dialectical theory. To see the importance of the Principle of Procedural Adequacy, 
consider what is involved in satisfying the Principle of Inferential Adequacy. Inferential adequacy 
is the problem of how do we know when our claims are true (or false), or at least, when should we 
accept a claim as true (or false)? The dominant answer in argumentation theory has gone something 
like this: We should accept a claim as true (or false) when it has been supported (or refuted) by 
good arguments. And then argumentation theory gives some general account of what a good 
argument is or provides specific types of good arguments. Johnson and Blair's (1994) well-known 
standards of premise acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency illustrate the former sort of account. 
Models of syllogistic reasoning or tests of argument from expert opinion or authority (e.g., Walton, 
1996) are examples of the latter sort of account.3 So, if an argument meets these standards or 
conforms to these models, it is a good one and we should accept its conclusion. If it doesn't meet 
these standards, we should reject it.  
 Now, the problem with this kind of answer has always been that application of these 
standards or model forms of reasoning is notoriously difficult. How, exactly, do we decide that an 
argument is a strong one or that the premises are acceptable? How do we decide that the critical 
tests for argument from expert opinion have been satisfied? Or how can we be sure that the model 
form applies to this particular case? And what do we do if no clear model seems to apply? Even 
more importantly, how do people involved in the argumentation decide this? When can they be 
said to have made a reasonable judgment?  
 If we cannot easily answer the question of how to assess the quality of an argument or a 
case as a whole or cannot give an altogether clear answer to the question as to when it is reasonable 
to accept or reject a position, one thing to do is to ask a different question. Ask instead, are the 
procedures reasonable by which these judgments are made? To what degree do we have reason to 
trust the decision-making process?  
 In a sense, debate models kick inferential problems upstairs to the meta-level. They try to 
design formats and spell out procedural obligations by which claims and arguments can be tested. 
 
3 Notice that critical questions are less than the dialectical image of debate in two ways. First, they are questions, not 
the open-ended set of objections and counterarguments that debate envisions. Second, testing through critical 
questions promotes monological argument expansion of supporting substructure, and not the dialogical argument 
extension produced in the back and forth of refutation, rebuttal, counter-rebuttal, and on. 
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On this account, the best arguments and most secure standpoints are those that have been subjected 
to the most critical scrutiny, that have taken into account the most comprehensive body of 
information, that have been considered against the broadest range of alternatives, that have 
answered the most determined objections, that have faced and overcome the most skeptical 
resistance (Jacobs, 2003).  Put another way, to the degree that debaters have been put into a position 
to adequately test opposing positions, secure claims and good arguments will be those that 
withstand objections (Cooper, 1989). 
 
4. PRINCIPLES OF THE DEBATE MODEL 
 
 The debate model spells out the procedural requirements for properly putting claims and 
arguments to the test. Those requirements amount to duties and obligations incumbent on debaters. 
Putting to the test the truth of claims and the probative force of arguments involves one principle 
obligation and five subordinate obligations.  
 
1. OBLIGATION OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION: Parties to a debate are responsible 
for holding themselves and others to discharging all duties and obligations.  
 
2. OBLIGATION TO MAKE PRIMA FACIE ADEQUATE MOVES. Parties are 
obligated to make their contributions ones that are presumptively satisfactory.  
 
3. OBLIGATION TO CLASH. Parties are obligated to challenge all moves that they find 
presumptively unacceptable.  
 
4. OBLIGATION TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF: Parties are obligated to put 
forward arguments when challenging presumptions.  
 
5. OBLIGATION TO MEET THE BURDEN OF REBUTTAL: Parties are obligated 
to answer any prima facie challenge of acceptability with argument sufficient to regain the 
presumption.  
 
6. OBLIGATION TO MEET THE BURDEN OF EXTENSION: Parties must advance 
their arguments so as to maintain their presumption.  
 
These six obligations operate as a system. The first obligation (self-administration) is primary 
because it operates as an animating principle by which all the other obligations are enforced and 
activated. The second (prima facie presumption) and third (clash) obligations create the internal 
dynamic that drives debate. The last three obligations follow from the others. Collectively, the 
obligations provide for all the features that debate theorists characteristically identify as the 
qualities of good argumentation: the emergence of controversy, the identification and 
crystallization of issues, the back and forth shifts of presumption, the development of cases and 




5. OBLIGATION OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION. 
 
The implementation of argumentation theory's Prime Directive through debate can be usefully 
seen as a specialized version of the participant administration found in conversational organization 
(Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974), albeit one in which debaters must maintain the roles of 
adversarial opponents. The Obligation of Self-Administration is fundamental, but is recognized 
only obliquely in debate textbooks. Still, it is crucial to the way all the other duties and obligations 
of debate are activated, interpreted and interact. This obligation has two consequences of note.  
 First, the Obligation of Self-Administration serves as a presupposed background to the 
interpretation of all other obligations: Unless the debaters themselves hold their opponents to 
account for failing to discharge their duties, opponents are presumed to have satisfactorily done 
so. This is why the role of the judge to a debate is not really the same as the role of an audience in 
a debate. The conception of judge as an object of persuasion has evolved over the decades into a 
conception of the judge as an evaluator of skill in play of the game. The judge stands outside the 
debate itself as a kind of meta-critic whose evaluations take on a decidedly non-substantive flavor. 
The judge's decisions are always supposed to be based on the merits of the arguments made in the 
debate, and not on arguments that could or should have been made but were not.4 Judges do not 
debate for or with the debaters (O'Neill, et al, 1917, p. 373). Nor are judges single person 
substitutes for public audiences.5 They are called on to invoke a "reasonable person" standard for 
judging argument quality insofar as this is needed to implement a kind of scorekeeper's role in 
determining the status of the debate as it unfolds across the flowsheet.6  
 
4 This is what Ewbank & Auer (1951) have in mind when distinguishing "the merits of the debate" versus "the 
merits of the question." They note:  
Judges in the first intercollegiate debates were instructed to "decide upon the merits of the debate, without 
regard to the merits of the question." With the exception of occasions where such devices as the shift-of-
opinion ballot are used, the same instructions are given today. It has always been understood that these 
instructions represent the ideal rather than the attainable. . . . A primary qualification of the debate judge, 
however, is that he be relatively free from prejudice on the question and have some skill in distinguishing 
between the strength of an argument and the manner of its presentation. (p. 473). 
5 To the degree that the debate judge still exercises substantive judgment (and to some degree they always must), it 
is in something like the role of a "reasonable person" (Perella, 1986, pp. 17-26) who embodies a standard of 
rationality, something akin to Mead's (1932) "generalized other" or Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) 
"universal audience" (see Jacobs & Jackson, 1982, pp. 214-218). Ehninger and Brockriede (1963, pp. 7-11) take a 
contrary, rhetorical view, seeing the contrast between debate and dialectic as a contrast between "external" decision-
making (by the judge) and "internal" decision-making (by the participants) which, as a matter of empirical practice, 
is certainly the case.   
6 The shift in conception stands behind the concern voiced by Reynolds (1975, p. 112-114. See also Klopf & 
Cambra (1979, p. 98): 
Regardless of form, academic debate must operate within a more or less closed system, governed by its 
own rules and procedures. Given these factors, competitive debate must presume reasonableness on the part 
of the audience (critic or judge). It must create a reality of its own in which the judge is preeminently 
rational, not only capable of suspending his or her own real-life prejudices and predilections but willing to 
reach a decision guided only by the arguments he or she hears in the course of the contest. . . . Definitions 
of reasonableness in judging present competitive debating with a dilemma of the first magnitude. If judges 
computerize themselves so that their decisions reflect only the response and counterresponse that occurs in 
the debate, they tend to sanction the abuses described above [squirrels, spread arguments, substandard 
communication]. . . . [Many judges] have conformed to a style of computerized decision making in which 
they permit themselves to be programmed by the flowsheet. Some rationalize their conformity in the name 
of fairness and impartiality; others conform out of fear of being branded old fashioned or being 
excommunicated by the group. 
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 Second, the Obligation of Self-Administration is a paradoxical requirement given the 
enforced roles of adversarial engagement. For their side to 'win', debaters must find at least some 
fault in their opponents' execution of duties, and they must not concede crucial lapses in their own 
conduct. The requirement maintain role, and the need for timely decision closure, is why there 
must be an external judge who renders a decision in any real-world debate if a decision is to be 
had. But, like Peirce's (1940) vision of truth as the asymptotically approached limit of inquiry, 
debaters in an ideal system, given sufficient competence, motivation, and time, would deploy 
argumentative principle and procedure to push the debate to the point of genuine exhaustion (as 
opposed to contingent exhaustion). The enforcement of adversarial roles pushes this process to its 
limits at the risk of exposure of non-answer or apparent absurdity of answer. The flowsheet of such 
a debate, like the tape in a Turing Machine, wouldn't lie. 
 
6. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE PRIMA FACIE ADEQUATE MOVES. 
 
Parties are obligated to make their contributions ones that are presumptively satisfactory, i.e., 
prima facie adequate. This obligation is based on the relationship between two concepts 
fundamental to the dynamics of debate. They are invariably discussed in debate textbooks in the 
context of the burden of proof, and almost always with regard to the demands of argument placed 
on the initiation of debate with the 1st Affirmative Constructive speech. As we shall see, that is 
liable to confuse matters. These two concepts need separate attention because they set out the 
geography of the grounds and locations in which the burden of proof need and need not apply. 
 The first concept is prima facie, which means "on the face of it," or "on first appearance" 
or "on first makings." To say that a move must be prima facie adequate is only to say that any 
contribution to a debate must meet a demand to appear satisfactory. Any move must sound 
plausible, seem sensible, appear reasonable in order to lay claim to a presumptive standing. This 
is always a tentative, provisional standing. Such contributions enjoy presumptive acceptability in 
the sense of acceptability until further notice. In debate, prima facie cases are ones that would be 
acceptable to a reasonable judge in the absence of refutation. In other words, if left unanswered, 
they would stand (cf., Behr, 1953, p. 248; O'Neill, et al, 1917, p. 35). But the term applies more 
generally to claims, arguments, explanations, objections--to all discourse moves in a debate. Taken 
as a procedural requirement, this obligation makes no assumption about what kinds of claims, 
arguments, or other moves should count, in principle, as prima facie adequate or should enjoy 
presumptive standing. The debate model is agnostic on that matter. And during a debate, whether 
or not any move does enjoy such standing is a matter that is self-administered by the debaters. 
  The second concept is that of presumption. Presumptions amount to debate moves, or 
conversational contributions more generally, that take effect without need of justification. 
Presumptions amount to formulations of the "given" or "taken-for granted" ground of inference 
and decision-making. Debate can be thought of as the means of creating, maintaining, denying, 
and removing this presumptive status from the propositions at issue by means of deploying 
(through assertion, argument, objection, answer) propositions that do enjoy such status. Crucially, 
once in effect, propositions that enjoy presumptive grounding can only be removed from that 
ground by argument, creating the burden of proof. But those arguments (refutations, objections, 
rebuttals)  must themselves be moves that enjoy presumptive status.  
 Because debate is a self-administered system, this Obligation of Prima Facie Adequacy 
works in tandem with the Obligation to Clash. The two obligations work to create for any unargued 
assertion, any baldly presented move, a presumption of its own satisfaction. Any substantive move 
 10 
in a debate purports or presumes, i.e., makes claim to, its own adequacy. Whether or not that claim 
to adequacy is ultimately cashed in and takes effect depends on what follows in the debate.  
 
7. THE OBLIGATION TO CLASH. 
 
In debate, parties are obligated to challenge all moves that they find presumptively unacceptable. 
This obligation in effect sets out The Duty to Debate. The need for sustained, pointed disagreement 
and clear objection and refutation--and not just construction of supporting arguments or passive 
posing of critical questions--is one of the key insights of debate coaches watching early student 
debates and puzzling over how to better promote idea testing and critical decision-making.  
 Clash has long distinguished debate from other argument formats. Both sides bear this 
obligation to clash (Edwards, 2008, pp. 153). Debaters must do more than simply build 
constructive cases in support of the proposition on their side of the resolution. They must answer 
and refute the claims and arguments of their opponents. Refutation is essential, not optional. And 
it can only be productively carried out if each side makes clear where they disagree, how, and why. 
Through clash issues are identified and developed. 
 The need to spell out this obligation and to create formats in which a structure of opposition 
could be made out more clearly was one of the early practical problems for debate directors and 
coaches. At least during the early decades of contest debating, speeches too often came off as an 
alternating set of arguments in support of the competing pro and con formulations of the resolution. 
For example, Thomas (1910, p. 161) complained of the "desultory" effect whereby "there is 
scarcely a single logical contest wherein both sides are engaged, the one in sustaining, the other in 
overthrowing, the same proposition." Arguing that "the Clash of Opinion will reveal the issues of 
the proposition" (p. 49), Foster (1911) saw a similar problem.7 Interestingly, both authors thought 
that displaying in parallel array outlines of Affirmative and Negative cases for constructive 
speeches would be a corrective. Some decades later, in discussing the need for the clash that 
"comes from adapting one's prepared material to that of the opposition," Crocker (1944, p. 182) 
dryly notes: "A debate which is like two parallel lines that meet only at infinity is about the 
deadliest performance imaginable." 
 Progress over the decades toward more extemporaneous speaking in successive speeches 
reflect the increasing insistence by coaches and judges that opposing sides exhibit clash in their 
arguments over the issues at stake (Cowperthwaite & Baird, 1954, pp. 266-267). By the 1970s, 
with the adoption of flowsheets that map out the lines of argument and counterargument across 
speeches, the distinction between "constructive" speeches and rebuttals had effectively 
disappeared. All but the 1st Affirmative Constructive speech became "constructive" in name only, 
subsequent speeches being devoted primarily to refutation and rebuttal of prior arguments. 
 
7 Foster (1911, pp. 184-185) laid the problem at the feet of elocutionists, blaming "the memorized speeches which 
render impossible that effective adaptation to opposing speakers, that running rebuttal, that one feature which 
distinguishes the real debater from the elocutionist." He called for  
a more sensible kind of instruction in speaking. The formalism, the unreality, the difficulty of producing a 
"head-on collision," which are complained of in present debating, are due in part to the traditional elocution 
which nine tenths of our institutions regard as training for debate. Yet none of the essentials of refutation, 
which is the life of debate is possessed by those who regard debating as the recitation of memorized 
speeches consisting for the most part of strings of quotations, delivered in supreme disregard of the equally 
automatic declamations of the "opposing" speakers. Such performances should not parade under the name 
of debating. They are not even preparation for debating. (p. 185) 
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 The Obligation to Clash (the Duty to Debate) may seem built-in to debate by binding 
assignment of opposing roles. But, given the overarching goal of idea testing, the obligation can 
be seen as a natural consequence of an even more fundamental principle of conversational 
organization: the preference for agreement (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980). Any speech act that is 
entered into a conversation carries with it a presumption of its own prima facie acceptability, and 
that presumption stands unless challenged. Agreement or acceptance is therefore taken for granted. 
In a self-administered system like debate, that means that silence counts as tacit consent. This 
makes dissent not merely a right or a matter of political liberty; it makes it a duty, an obligation 
incumbent on any party who wishes not to accept the binding force of an opponent's claims and 
arguments.  
 
8. THE OBLIGATION TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
Parties to a debate are obligated to put forward arguments when challenging presumptions. This 
obligation can be seen as the Duty to Argue, and it sets out the conditions under which arguments 
must be put forward. It follows from the Obligation to Make Prima Facie Adequate Moves and 
from the Obligation to Clash together with the assumptions that (1) to gain the presumption for 
moves that are not in themselves presumptively (prima facie) acceptable, those moves must be 
grounded in good reason, and also (2) to remove the presumption enjoyed by a contradicting prima 
facie acceptable move, the removal must be grounded in good reason. Not all moves need be 
argued for. For much of debate, as with ordinary conversation, the strength of the presumption of 
adequacy carried by any move is, in itself, good enough. Most moves face no presumption against 
them and can take effect on the strength of their own making.8  
 This is not the way that the Obligation to Meet the Burden of Proof is ordinarily explained 
in debate textbooks, but it is in fact the way that it is applied in practice by coaches, debaters, and 
judges. So, explanation is in order.  Historically, because debate resolutions have been designed 
to award the presumption to the Negative side of a policy resolution, textbooks have generally 
confounded the idea of the obligation to put forward a prima facie case with the obligation to meet 
the burden of proof, and often with the idea that a prima facie case needs to spell out a set of 
arguments on "stock issues" in the Affirmative Constructive speeches (e.g., Perella, 1986, p. 197). 
This is traditionally explained by the old-fashioned dictum, "He who asserts must prove" (e.g., 
MacEwan, 1898, p. 34). That may be true for asserting the debate resolution, but it doesn't follow 
for all assertions.9  
 The confusion persists in the literature because of the peculiar standing of the 1st 
Affirmative Constructive speech. No Affirmative debater expects to be able to assert the policy 
resolution without forwarding argument sufficient to justify that resolution (i.e., a prima facie 
case). But this is not because of a general obligation to prove what they assert. It is because the 
Affirmative side, by design of the resolution, is cast into the role of challenging the presumptive 
status of the Negative side of the resolution. 
 While closely aligned, the gap between the Obligation to Make Prima Facie Adequate 
Moves and the Obligation to Meet the Burden of Proof can be seen in a strategy of gamesmanship 
noticed very early in the development of contest debating, what is sometimes today called 
 
8 There are cases where contrary propositions both face a presumption against them, in which case, both sides must 
be argued for.  
9 Arguments for assertions, after all, also consist of assertions, and the arguments for those assertions will also 
consist of assertions, and on. There simply aren't enough turtles to provide the kind of grounding called for. 
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"sandbagging." This is the practice of making a claim but providing no or only minimal backing 
for the claim.  Apparently, sandbagging was a noticeable problem for in early debate formats 
where both sides were merely allotted an overall time limit but no particular time limit on any 
individual speech. Affirmative debaters would make minimal constructive speeches, then 
overwhelm the Negative response in rebuttal. At least by the 1920s the practice had become 
annoying enough that debate format was changed to impose time limits on individual speeches, 
thus reducing the incentive and ability of debaters to deploy the tactic. Adding additional speaking 
slots rather than using the three speech Lincoln-Douglas format no doubt also helped.  
 A similar tactic commonplace in more contemporary debating is for an Affirmative team 
to address some but not all of the allegedly necessarily relevant stock issues in their initial 
constructive speech.10  Partly this is because for any particular case or plan it is recognized to be 
unnecessary to make the argument, e.g., it is obvious to everyone that the plan is feasible and, if 
enacted, would "work" to solve the alleged problem; or it is obvious that some state of affairs, if it 
existed as alleged, would be a serious problem. Partly this is because for most cases it is not 
possible to anticipate the nature of Negative objections on the issue, e.g., the kinds of 
disadvantages that might be alleged to accrue from the plan; or why the Negative might contend 
that the Affirmative plan or case failed to be topical the topical. And sometimes an issue isn't 
covered because the Affirmative team would rather insinuate prima facie adequacy hoping the 
issue will be taken for granted and not challenged by the Negative side. Nobody anymore expects 
Affirmative debaters to establish all this ground (if any judge ever did). 
 The underlying strategy in both sandbagging and stock issue management is one of making 
a prima facie case by implicating presumptive adequacy without argument. The Affirmative 
debaters haven't met the burden of proof in the strong sense sometimes laid out in debate textbooks 
("He who asserts must prove"; argue for all the necessary stock issues) because there is no 
countervailing presumption on those issues. And if there is, that is something the Negative debaters 
will have to establish with their arguments in response.  
  
9. THE OBLIGATION TO MEET THE BURDEN OF REBUTTAL 
 
Parties are obligated to answer any prima facie challenge to the acceptability of a move with 
argument sufficient to regain the presumption. Textbooks sometimes call this a burden of proof 
to distinguish it from the burden of proof traditionally assigned to the Affirmative side of the 
resolution. Most have settled on the phrase used here, else they call it the burden of rejoinder. 
And everyone agree that this burden shifts back and forth with the ebb and flow of argument and 
counterargument, objection and answer. By the logic of the previous obligations, claims, 
arguments, and cases that have been met with a prima facie adequate challenge have lost their 
presumptive status. Even the weakest challenge cannot go unanswered. It must at least be 
pointed out to lack prima facie adequacy. If the Obligation to Clash in a self-administered system 
means that silence amounts to tacit consent, then any move by an opponent that purports to 
refute a move cannot be dropped. It will stand if unanswered. As Edwards (2008) explains: 
 
10 Lists of stock issues for policy resolutions commonly include: The Affirmative plan and case meets the resolution 
(Topicality). There is a need for change (Significance). The status quo is inherently unable to achieve that change 
(Uniqueness/Inherency). The Affirmative plan would achieve that change (Solvency/Workability). The change 
would come without overriding disadvantages (Cost). Lists and terminology varies (cf. Ehninger & Brockriede, 
1963, pp. 217-228; Freeley, 1961, pp. 32-35; Goodwin, 1982, pp. 72-85; Hill & Leeman, 1997, pp. 161-199). The 
issues analysis is drawn from the concept of stasis (Dieter, 1950) and finds a contemporary analogue in the speech 
act theory of felicity conditions (Kline, 1979). 
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[The burden of rejoinder] means an argument made by one team is assumed by the judge 
to be true unless and until the other teams answers the argument. . . . In the language of a 
debater, the negative team has dropped or granted the argument by failing to respond to 
it. It is because of the burden of rejoinder that the flowsheet is so important in policy 
debate. Everyone in the debate round--all four debaters and the judge--keep careful track 
of the arguments in the order they have been made. (pp. 78-79)11 
This obligation to answer is implicated in both debate's most powerful property--the relentless 
probing brought on by extended clash--and its most vexing abuse--"spreading." Spreads would 
not be possible were it not for the Obligation to Meet the Burden of Rebuttal. 
 Like its cousin, sandbagging, the spread exploits the artificial time limits on speaker turns 
and takes advantage of the specialized competence of the expert judges who were installed as 
contest debating shed its disciplinary association with rhetorical oratory for a public audience. 
Increasingly, debaters were allowed to speak as rapidly as possible, use acronyms, abbreviations, 
technical terms and stock phrases, and read off flowsheets that mapped the arguments up to that 
point in the debate. Judges allowed it because they kept their own flowsheets and they were 
practiced in listening to debates and had already heard the same or similar arguments in 
countless tournaments and practice rounds throughout the school year. So the debaters are 
speaking clearly and intelligibly to the judge's ear even though every word spoken may be 
completely unintelligible to an ordinary hearer.12 This is a perfectly predictable development in 
response to the pressures to maximize the arguments and evidence said within the time allowed, 
given the increased channel capacity of the technical judge and the fluency of the debater.  
 The debater who uses the spread tactic lodges as many objections and counterarguments 
to the opponent's arguments as they can possibly get out of their mouth. The idea is to raise so 
many arguments that the opponent cannot possibly hope to answer them all. Then, in follow-up, 
the debater selects the weak, limited answers for rebuttal or simply pulls through those 
objections and arguments that received no answer at all. Almost no one really likes the spread 
tactic. Everybody recognizes that it is exacerbated by the machine gun speed of delivery. And 
taken simply as an argumentation tactic, it is widely seen as promoting a kind of cheap, knee-jerk 
and superficial level of argument that runs contrary to the educational goal of encouraging the 
critical and reflective depth of analysis that the Principle of Procedural Adequacy would seem to 
call for. And nobody has designed a good way to "solve" the problem. 
 But, taking contest debate as an analytic laboratory, the logic of the spread tactic reveals 
the operation of the Burden of Rebuttal. The thing to see is that while no one much likes the 
spread,  everyone sees that it is, in principle, a legitimate tactic. Debaters win with it because 
they invoke principles of argumentation as a rational activity. Debaters lose against it because 
they are under an obligation to answer any and all arguments and objections that are prima facie 
adequate. And given the internal dynamics of debate--a self-administered system wherein prima 
facie validity of moves are presumptively achieved (i.e., until answered)--the slow talking 
debaters is left speechless, and defenseless. 
 
 
11 In the Glossary of Debate Terms, Edwards (2008) puts it this way 
burden of rebuttal Debaters have the responsibility to respond to the arguments made in the previous 
speech; if the debater offers no response, the judge has the right to assume that the argument is accepted as 
true. (p. 331) 
12 Kleinau in 1982 complained, "The average judge is unable to comprehend delivery at the level of 275 words-per-
minute" (p. 260). Tolchinsky (2011) claimed to record debaters speaking at a rate of 500 words-per-minute. But see 
also fnte 2, this paper. 
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10. OBLIGATION TO MEET THE BURDEN OF EXTENSION 
 
Parties in a debate are not only required to regain lost presumptions by rebutting 
counterargument, they must also maintain the presumptions they possess by continuing to 
advance their arguments throughout the debate. As many authors put it, there is a burden to 
advance the argument, to create movement through the flow of the debate. At its best, both sides 
in a debate will be elaborating, building, and expanding the depth of proof, the range of 
evidence, and the acuity of their analysis.13  
 Part of this obligation already follows from those already mentioned: Debaters must not 
merely repeat themselves in answering an opponent's arguments and objections. At best, 
repetition of an argument in the face of an objection to it risks a stand-off that goes nowhere, and 
if the objection is prima facie adequate, the repetition has not regained what it has already lost in 
the face of that objection. The presumption will not shift back.  And at worst, the repetition 
openly acknowledges the need to respond but indicates that the arguer has nothing to say in 
defense. 
 This phenomenon could be analyzed as part of the Burden of Rebuttal, as a kind of 
"drop." A related phenomena, however, cannot.  That is the double drop. When a debater asks 
the judge to "extend" an argument, they are really just saying that the opponent did not answer 
the argument and they are asking the judge to take note of the argument and not to forget it 
(Edwards, 2008, p. 331). When a debater does not do this, there has been a double drop. 
Sometimes this goes on through several columns of the debate flowsheet, depending on when the 
first drop occurred.  
 And the evaluative problem for the judge is telling. If everyone has forgotten an 
argument, does it count or not? Is its force still active, or has it been inactivated by virtue of 
neglect? Is the side that initially made the argument simply presuming its active status and 
relevance to the overall standing of the debate? Does the opposing side simply presume the 
argument is now inactive? Or has everyone just lost track of that line of argument and no longer 
takes it to have force? This is particularly problematic when the dropped argument had particular 
force as refutation or special strength in support of a crucial claim. Debate textbooks provide no 
clear answer to this problem.  
 But taken as an analytic puzzle, and not just as a practical problem of rendering a 
decision by a judge, the phenomenon reveals the operation of the Burden of Extension. It is a 
problem because neither opponent has met their obligation (neither rebuttal nor extension), and 
neither has held the opposing party accountable. Like digressions and lapses for ordinary 
 
13 While considering common errors of refutation, Faules, Rieke & Rhodes (1976) list: 
Lack of Movement. When debaters are following the trend of the debate they are expected to do more than 
summarize. A good debate has movement, and crucial arguments evolve that must be reinforced or destroyed. 
The areas of agreement and disagreement ought to be made clear in the rebuttal period. Arguments are not 
established merely by repeating them. (p. 184) 
Likewise Kleinau (1982) comments: 
The debaters should advance the argument. The most exciting time in a debate should be the rebuttal stage. 
It is then that you will extend the arguments advanced in the four constructive speeches. To extend means 
to advance the argument. Ideally that extension will include new evidence, a more detailed explanation, or 
perhaps a simple comparison of advantages espoused by the opposing teams on various issues. . . . If you 
only repeat or rehash the materials or explanations offered in the first speech, you will have failed to help 
the judge understand how one position is superior to the other. (p. 229) 
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conversationalists, only self-administration can resolve the conundrum. Without any internal 




The attempt to explicitly articulate the obligations and duties of debaters amounts to an effort to 
represent the rational basis for argumentation at the procedural level. The principles are 
themselves grounded in the pragmatics of discourse and the natural organization of conversation 
adjusted to the project of putting the truth of claims to the test. As such, the articulated model is 
as much discovery as construction, and the efforts of debate scholars to design workable formats 
that cultivate reasonable debate practice is as much an analytic project as it is a pedagogical one. 
Contest debating is a laboratory for training good practice in argumentation, but also for 
observing the principles of good argumentation in practice. Pedagogical problems in conduct are 
also analytic puzzles for intuitions.  
 The debate tradition is as old as the discipline of communication. It represents a 
genuinely dialectical perspective that is distinct from its rhetorical and logical counterparts in 
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